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Causal Erasure Channels
Raef Bassily∗ Adam Smith∗
Abstract
We consider the communication problem over binary causal adversarial erasure channels.
Such a channel maps n input bits to n output symbols in {0, 1,∧}, where ∧ denotes erasure.
The channel is causal if, for every i, the channel adversarially decides whether to erase the ith bit
of its input based on inputs 1, ..., i, before it observes bits i+1 to n. Such a channel is p-bounded if
it can erase at most a p fraction of the input bits over the whole transmission duration. Causal
channels provide a natural model for channels that obey basic physical restrictions but are
otherwise unpredictable or highly variable. For a given erasure rate p, our goal is to understand
the optimal rate (the “capacity”) at which a randomized (i.e., stochastic) encoder/decoder can
transmit reliably across all causal p-bounded erasure channels.
In this paper, we introduce the causal erasure model and provide new upper bounds (im-
possibility results) and lower bounds (analyses of codes) on the achievable rate. Our bounds
separate the achievable rate in the causal erasures setting from the rates achievable in two re-
lated models: random erasure channels (strictly weaker) and fully adversarial erasure channels
(strictly stronger). Specifically, we show:
• A strict separation between random and causal erasures for all constant erasure rates
p ∈ (0, 1). In particular, we show that the capacity of causal erasure channels is 0 for
p ≥ 1/2 (while it is nonzero for random erasures).
• A strict separation between causal and fully adversarial erasures for p ∈ (0, φ) where
φ ≈ 0.348.
• For p ∈ [φ, 1/2), we show codes for causal erasures that have higher rate than the best
known constructions for fully adversarial channels.
Our results contrast with existing results on correcting causal bit-flip errors (as opposed to
erasures) [4, 5, 6, 9, 11]. For the separations we provide, the analogous separations for bit-flip
models are either not known at all or much weaker.
1 Introduction
Reliable communication over erasure channels is a central topic in coding and information theory.
Erasure channels are noisy channels in which symbols are either transmitted intact or “erased”,
that is, replaced by a special symbol ∧ denoting a visible error. They are interesting in their own
right (in settings where transmission errors are detectable by the decoder), and as intermediate
abstractions in the construction of codes for other models.
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The two classic approaches model erasure channels either as a known stochastic process (c.f.
Shannon[16]), or as an adversarial process subject only to a limit on the number of erasures it
can introduce (c.f. Hamming [8]). Adversarial models are more flexible, as they capture varying
or poorly understood channels. Yet the maximum rate of reliable transmission over adversarial
channels is much lower than over stochastic channels with a similar rate of erasures.
In this paper, we introduce and study causal adversarial erasure channels. Such channels are
adversarial, but limited to introduce erasures online as the symbols are transmitted, based only on
the symbols sent so far. They provide a natural, intermediate model between stochastic and fully
adversarial models. In particular, they capture any physical channel over which symbols are sent
and received sequentially. Examples include i.i.d. erasures, as well as a large range of more complex
channels (e.g., burst erasures). We prove that the achievable rate of causal erasure channels lies
strictly between the achievable rates of analogous stochastic and fully adversarial models. Our
model is inspired by recent work on causal error channels [4, 5, 6, 9, 11], discussed in “Previous
Work”, below.
Specifically, an erasure channel is a randomized map from {0, 1}n to {0, 1,∧}n. The channel is
causal if, for every i, the channel decides whether to erase the ith bit of its input based on inputs
1, ..., i, before it observes bits i + 1 to n. The channel is p-bounded if it can erase at most pn
fraction of the input bits over the whole transmission duration. A (stochastic) code is a pair of
(randomized) encoding/decoding algorithms (Enc,Dec) that map a message space U to a codeword
in {0, 1}n, and a received word in {0, 1,∧}n to a candidate message in U . Given p, the code is
required to transmit reliably (with high probability) across all p-bounded causal erasure channels.
In particular, the channel’s behavior may depend on the code itself, and no secret randomness is
allowed to be shared between the encoder and decoder. The rate of the code is log(|U|)/n (the
ratio of bits transmitted to channel uses). We are interested in the capacity Cp of causal erasure
channels, that is, the maximum achievable rate in the limit of large n, as a function of p. (See
“System Model”, below, for precise definitions.)
Causal channels provide a natural model for channels that obey basic physical restrictions but
are otherwise unpredictable or highly variable. A line of recent work discussed below (“Previous
Work”) considers causal bit-flip channels; ours is the first to study causal erasures.
We provide new upper bounds (impossibility results) and lower bounds (analyses of codes) on
the achievable rate of codes for causal erasures. To frame our results, consider the two other classes
of p-bounded channels mentioned above, namely random erasures and fully adversarial erasures.
The channel that erases a uniformly random set of pn positions (or, essentially equivalently, erases
each symbol independently with probability p). The capacity of this channel is 1− p (and efficient
constructions are known that achieve this rate). In contrast, the best achievable rate over fully
adversarial channels is less well understood. In terms of asymptotic rate, codes for p-bounded fully
adversarial channels are equivalent to codes in which every pair of valid codewords differ in at least
pn+1 positions.1 Understanding the rate of such codes is a long-standing open problem in coding
theory; the best upper bounds (a combination of the Bassalygo-Elias [2] and LP bounds [13]) and
lower bounds (given by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound) are plotted in Figure 1. A few features
stand out: the asymptotic achievable rate over fully adversarial channels is 0 for p ≥ 1/2, and the
curve has unbounded slope as it approaches p = 0 (specifically, the maximum rate is 1−Θ(p ln(1p))
1This equivalence is trivial if we insist that the code have zero probability of error over fully adversarial channels.
The equivalence is nontrivial (but still holds, by a method-of-expectations argument) if the encoder/decoder can be
randomized and a small probability of decoding error is allowed.
2
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
p
Lo
w
er
 a
nd
 U
pp
er
 B
ou
nd
s
 
 
Our Lower Bound
GV Bound
Our Upper Bound
Best Upper bound (LP/BE) for the Fully Adversarial Channel
Capacity of Binary Random Erasues Channel
Figure 1: Upper and lower bounds on the capacity of the binary-erasure channel.
as p goes to 0).
Our Results. We give two main bounds on the capacity Cp of p-bounded causal erasure channels
(depicted in Fig. 1). We show:
1. The capacity Cp is at most (1− 2p)
+. This is the same value as the Plotkin bound for codes
with minimum distance pn+ 1, but it requires a different proof; see “Techniques”, below.
We show this by giving a particular adversarial strategy, analogous to the “Wait and Push”
strategy of Dey et al. [4] in the bit-flip setting.
2. The capacity Cp is at least the function RL(p) given in Theorem 2 and plotted in Fig. 1. We
show this via a random coding argument inspired by (but quite different from) that of [9].
The resulting encoder/decoder pair are not polynomial time in general.
Our bounds have several implications for the relation between random, causal, and fully-
adversarial erasure models.
• For every constant p ∈ (0, 1), the achievable rate of codes for causal channels is strictly worse
than the rate of codes for random errors (since 1− 2p < 1− p). In particular, the achievable
rate over causal channels is 0 for p ≥ 1/2 (whereas it is nonzero for random errors).
• The capacity of causal erasure channels is strictly greater than that of fully adversarial era-
sures for p ∈ (0, φ) where φ ≈ 0.348. This is the point where our lower bound intersects the
best known upper bounds on the rate of codes with minimum distance pn+1 (see Figure 1).
Moreover, the graph of our lower bound has finite slope at p = 0, meaning that for low erasure
rates, O(pn) bits of redundancy suffice to tolerate causal erasures, while fully adversarial ones
require Θ(np ln(1p)) bits of redundancy.
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• For p ∈ [φ, 12 ), we show codes for causal erasures that have higher rate than the best known
constructions for fully adversarial channels. That is, our lower bound lies strictly above the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound for all p in (0, 12). Our lower bound lies below the best upper bounds
for p ∈ (φ, 12), however, and a strict separation in that range remains an open question.
Previous Work. A number of works have sought to find middle ground between the optimism
of random-error models and more pessimistic fully adversarial, “combinatorial” error models. For
example, arbitrarily varying channels [1, 3] allow the each symbol to be corrupted by one of several
operators (selected adversarially). Computationally-bounded channels [7, 12, 14] consider channels
whose action can be described by a low-complexity circuit.
Most relevant to this work, Dey et al. [4, 5, 11] and Haviv and Langberg [9] recently studied
causal (or “online”) bit-flip channels (as well as errors over larger alphabets [6]). They describe
upper and lower bounds on the capacity of such channels, and our work was inspired by their
approaches. As in the case of erasures, there are three natural, nested models for bit-flip errors:
random, causal and fully adversarial.
Our results paint a much more complete picture of the situation for causal erasures than is
known for causal bit-flip errors. For each of the separations we show, the analogous separation for
bit-flip errors is either not known or much weaker.
• A strict separation between causal and random bit-flip errors is not known to hold for all
error rates; for small error rates (less than about 0.08), the best-known upper bound on
causal errors is the capacity of the binary symmetric (random bit-flip error) channel [4].
• No strict separation is known between causal errors and fully adversarial errors. In fact, it is
only for a small range of error rates that any codes are known to beat the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound [9].
One may view our results on erasures as an indication that the separations among bit-flip error
models are, in fact, strict. We hope that our results provide some insight into these questions.
Techniques. As mentioned above, the proofs of our upper and lower bounds are inspired by
techniques of [4, 9]. This is natural, since any erasure channel can be converted to a bit-flip channel
by replacing erasures with random bits. Upper bounds on erasure channels thus imply upper bounds
on bit-flip channels (and vice-versa for lower bounds). Our results are much stronger, however, than
what follow that way from previous work.
Our upper bound is a strengthening of one of the bounds of [4] (and of the Plotkin bound).
The main technical innovation is in the lower bound, the heart of which is a bound on the size of a
“forbidden ball” (a set of points around a codeword within which the presence of other codewords
may cause a decoding error). The geometry of this ball is quite different from the analogous
structure for bit-flip errors, and the proof ends up being highly specific to erasures.
2 System Model
We consider communication problem over the class of causal erasure adversarial channels with
parameter p ∈ [0, 1], denoted by CEp. For a transmission duration of n symbols, a channel Adv ∈
CEp is defined by the triple (X
n, {Advi, i = 1, .., n},Yn) where X = {0, 1}, Y = {0, 1,∧} is the
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input, output alphabet per symbol, and Advi : X i × Y i−1 → Y, i = 1, ..., n is a (randomized)
function that, at time instant i, maps the observed sequence of input symbols up to the current
instant i , xi1 ∈ X
i, together with the sequence of all the previous output symbols up to i − 1,
yi−11 ∈ Y
i−1, to an output symbol yi ∈ {xi,∧} such that by the end of transmission, i.e., when
i = n, the number of erased symbols in y is at most pn. Except for the causality constraint and
the constraint on the total number of erasures, the channel’s behavior is arbitrary.
The transmitter’s message set is denoted by U = {0, 1}⌈nR⌉ for some R ≥ 0. For simplicity of
notation, we assume, w.l.o.g., that nR is an integer. In this paper, we consider two different settings
for the message to be transmitted: in Section 3 where we derive an upper bound on the capacity of
CEp, we will assume a uniformly distributed message U over the set U whereas, in Section 4 where
we derive a lower bound on the same capacity, we will assume that the message is arbitrarily fixed
and even known to channel before the transmission starts and hence, our construction works for
any message u ∈ U . Adopting these two different settings in the upper and lower bounds is meant
to give stronger results. That is, an upper bound for the uniform message setting implies the same
upper bound for any distribution over the message set. On the other hand, a lower bound for the
“worst case” setting where the message is arbitrarily chosen and known to the channel beforehand
implies the same lower bound for any distribution over the message set.
A (2nR, n) code is defined as a pair (Enc,Dec) where Enc : U → X n is a (stochastic) encoder and
Dec : Yn → U is a decoder. No shared randomness is assumed between the encoder and the decoder.
The encoder maps (with the possible use of local randomness) a message U ∈ U to a codeword
X ∈ X n which serves as an n-bit input of Adv. With no loss of generality, Enc is assumed to
be injective. That is, for every distinct pair of messages u, u′, we have Enc(u) 6= Enc(u′) with
probability 1. The decoder Dec maps the channel’s output sequence Y ∈ Yn (with at most pn
erasures) to an estimate of the transmitted message Uˆ .
Since we assume different settings of the message distribution in Sections 3 and 4, we will have
two different versions of the error criterion. In Section 3, since the message U is assumed to be
uniformly distributed over U , our error criterion will be the average probability of decoding error.
With respect to a code (Enc,Dec) and a channel Adv ∈ CEp, the average probability of decoding
error denoted by Pnavg (Enc,Dec,Adv) , P
(
Uˆ 6= U
)
is given by
Pnavg (Enc,Dec,Adv) ,
1
2nR
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈Xn
P (Enc(u) = x)
∑
y∈Yn
P (Adv(x) = y)P (Dec(y) 6= u) (1)
where P (Enc(u) = x) is the conditional probability that the output of the encoder Enc is x ∈ X n
when the input message is u ∈ U , P (Advn(x) = y) is the conditional probability that the channel
Adv, after the whole transmission duration, outputs the sequence y ∈ Yn given that the input
sequence is x ∈ X n, and P (Dec(y) = uˆ) is the conditional probability that the output of the decoder
Dec is uˆ ∈ U given that its input (the received sequence) is y ∈ Yn. In Section 4, since we consider
the setting where the message is arbitrarily fixed and known to the channel in advance, our error
criterion will be the maximum probability of decoding error over all messages u ∈ U (i.e., the
worst-case probability of error with respect to the set of all messages). With respect to a code
(Enc,Dec) and a channel Adv ∈ CEp, the maximum probability of decoding error over all the
messages, denoted by Pnmax (Enc,Dec,Adv), is given by
Pnmax (Enc,Dec,Adv) , max
u∈U
∑
x∈Xn
P (Enc(u) = x)
∑
y∈Yn
P (Advn(x) = y)P (Dec(y) 6= u) (2)
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When Enc, Dec, and Adv are clear from the context, we will drop them from the above notation
and use just Pnavg (or P
n
max).
A rate R is said to be achievable for CEp if for every ǫ > 0 there exists a sequence of codes
{(2n(R−ǫ), n) : n ≥ 1} such that for every β > 0 there exists an integer nβ such that for all
Adv ∈ CEp, we have P
n
max < β for all n > nβ. Note that since the condition on P
n
max must hold
for every Adv ∈ CEp, Adv is allowed to depend on the code. The capacity of CEp, denoted as Cp,
is defined as the supremum of all achievable rates for CEp.
As a remark on notation, we will use upper-case letters for random variables, lower-case letters
for fixed realizations, bold-face letters for vectors, and normal letters for scalars. We will also use
u to denote a message
3 Upper Bound
Our upper bound on Cp, denoted by RUpper(p), is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For every p ∈ [0, 1], the capacity of CEp, Cp, is at most
Cp ≤ RUpper(p) , (1− 2p)
+ (3)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0) for x ∈ R.
To prove this upper bound on Cp, we show that there exists an adversarial strategy run by
some Adv ∈ CEp that imposes a decoding error with a probability bounded away from zero for any
(2nR, n) code with R > RUpper(p). In particular, we show that for every ǫ > 0, RUpper(p) + ǫ is not
achievable for Adv ∈ CEp, i.e., no matter what (2
n(RUpper(p)+ǫ), n) code is used or how large n is,
there is an adversarial strategy that causes Pnavg to be bounded from below by a positive constant
that does not depend on n. We assume here a uniformly distributed message U over U as discussed
in the previous section. Note that this immediately implies the same result if Pnmax criterion is used
instead and hence our result is even stronger.
The adversarial strategy Adv used is quite similar to the one proposed in [4]. Our adversarial
strategy is a “wait-push” strategy where the channel (i.e., the adversary) splits the transmission
in two phases: (i) the wait phase, where the channel observes a prefix x1 of length ℓ bits (to be
specified later) of the transmitted codeword x without erasing any bits in this phase. The channel
uses this phase to construct a list Lx1 (whose size is potentially smaller than size of the whole code)
of “candidate” codewords that are consistent with the observed prefix x1 among which is the actual
codeword chosen by the transmitter, (ii) the push phase, where the channel chooses a codeword x′
randomly from Lx1 (which, with a positive probability, corresponds to a different message than the
one originally chosen by the transmitter), then for the last n − ℓ bits of the transmission, i.e., for
i = ℓ+ 1, ..., n, the channel erases the bit xi of x whenever xi 6= x
′
i (where x
′
i is the ith bit of x
′).
We denote the ℓ-prefix of codeword x by x1 and (n − ℓ)-suffix by x2. Similarly, the last n − ℓ
bits of the channel’s output sequence y is denoted by y2. Before we give the formal statements
that constitute the main body of the proof of Theorem 1, we will informally describe the proof
steps to give some intuition about the underlying idea of the proof. First suppose that by the end
of the waiting phase the observed prefix of the transmitted codeword is x1, then the remaining
uncertainty about the message U (at the receiver and the channel) is given by H(U |X1 = x1).
6
Let’s consider the set of prefixes x1 for which such uncertainty is large enough. Namely, we define
Aǫ , {x1 : x is a codeword, H(U |X1 = x1) > n
ǫ
4
} (4)
Our first step of the proof is to show that, for some choice of ℓ, the probability that the observed
prefix X1 of the actual codeword lies in Aǫ is a strictly positive constant.
Next, conditioning on such event, for every prefix x1 ∈ Aǫ, we introduce a list, denoted by Lx1 ,
which contains all the codewords that shares the same prefix x1. More formally, Lx1 is defined as
Lx1 , {x
′ ∈ X n : ∃u′ ∈ U s.t. Enc(u′) = x′, x′1 = x1} (5)
Our goal then is to show that the size of such list is small enough such that a codeword picked up
randomly by the channel (according the conditional distribution of X given X1 = x1) from such
list will, with a strictly positive constant probability, end up being: (i) an encoding of a different
message other than the actual message, and (ii) at a Hamming distance less than pn from the
actual codeword (corresponding to the actual message) that is originally transmitted. Hence, by
pushing the transmission towards such fake codeword in the push phase, the channel will succeed,
with a strictly positive constant probability, in fooling the decoder causing it to believe that the
transmitted codeword is the fake one and hence rendering a decoding error.
The following lemma constitutes the first step of the proof. In this lemma, we formally give a
lower bound on the probability of the event that the ℓ-prefixX1 of the actual codewordX = Enc(U)
lies in the set Aǫ for a specific choice of ℓ.
Lemma 1 Let p ∈ (0, 12 ] and 0 < ǫ < 4p. Set R = RUpper(p) + ǫ and ℓ =
(
RUpper(p) +
ǫ
2
)
n. Let
E1 denote the event {X1 ∈ Aǫ} where Aǫ is given by (4). Then, we must have P(E1) ≥
ǫ
4
The next lemma furnishes the central part of the proof of Theorem 1 and highlights the main
idea of a successful “push” strategy.
Lemma 2 Let p, ǫ, ℓ, and R be as in Lemma 1. Let x1 be a legitimate codeword prefix and let
Lx1 be as defined in (5). Let X
′ denote a codeword that is randomly sampled from Lx1 according to
the conditional distribution of the encoder’s output X given that X1 = x1. Let U
′ be the message
corresponding to X′. Let E2 denote the event {U
′ 6= U, dH (X
′,X) ≤ np} where dH(., .) is the
Hamming distance between two binary vectors of length n, U is the original message, and X =
Enc(U) is the original codeword that is being transmitted. Then, we must have
P (E2 | X1 = x1) ≥ ǫ
O(1/ǫ) whenever x1 ∈ Aǫ (6)
for all sufficiently large n, where Aǫ is as given by (4).
We defer the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 to the appendix. Now, given those lemmas, we are
ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: First, observe that the event E2 of Lemma 2 guarantees the success of
the wait-push strategy since it ensures that the fake codeword X′ drawn randomly from Lx1 after
observing the prefix x1 according to the conditional distribution of X given X1 = x1 has the
following two properties. The first property is that the fake codeword X′ results from the encoding
of a different message U ′ 6= U . The second property is that the Hamming distance between the
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actual codeword X and the fake codeword X′ is at most pn and hence the channel would have
enough erasures budget to erase those bits of X that differ from the fake codeword X′. Thus, the
received sequence Y after the push phase will make the decoder completely uncertain whether the
transmitted message is U or U ′. Therefore, conditioned on E2, a decoding error will occur with
probability at least 1/2. Thus, to prove our theorem, it suffices to show that P(E2) is strictly positive
constant that does not depend on n. To do this, we derive a lower bound on P(E1, E2) where E1
is the event of Lemma 1, namely, the event that the ℓ-prefix X1 of X lies in the set Aǫ. Observe
that, by Lemmas 1 and 2, we have P(E2) ≥ P(E1, E2) =
∑
x1∈Aǫ
P (E2 | X1 = x1)P (X1 = x1)
≥ ǫO(1/ǫ)P(E1) ≥ ǫ
O(1/ǫ). This completes the proof of the theorem.
4 Lower Bound
In this section, we present a lower bound on Cp, denoted by RL(p). As discussed in Section 2, we
consider the worst-case error scenario where, before transmission starts, an arbitrary message u ∈ U
is chosen and is known to the channel (this means that u can actually be chosen by the channel
itself before transmission). Our goal is to show, for every p ∈ [0, 1/2] and every small ǫ > 0, the
existence of a (2nR, n) code, i.e., an encoder-decoder pair (Enc, Dec), where R ≥ RL(p)− ǫ, such
that for every Adv ∈ CEp, the probability of decoding error P
n
max, defined in (2), can be made
arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n.
We will show the existence of such code with a randomized (i.e., stochastic) encoder Enc that
takes two inputs. The first input is the message u ∈ U = {0, 1}nR. The second input is a random
string S drawn randomly and uniformly from a set S , {0, 1}δn for some small δ (to be specified
later)2. The second input to the encoder is generated locally and is not shared with the decoder
Dec. Hence, we will twist the notation a little bit in this section and write Enc as a two-input
function Enc(u, s), u ∈ U , s ∈ S to explicitly express the fact that it is a randomized encoder. Our
randomized encoder will have a specific form, namely, for an input message u ∈ U , the first Rn bits
of the encoder’s output is the message u itself. Hence, we call it a systematic randomized encoder
which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Systematic randomized encoder) Let R, δ > 0, U = {0, 1}Rn, and S =
{0, 1}δn. A systematic randomized encoder of a
(
2Rn, n
)
code is a function Enc : U × S → {0, 1}n
whose second input is picked uniformly at random from S. Moreover, for every input (u, s) ∈ U×S,
the output of the systematic encoder Enc(u, s) is an n-bit codeword x(u, s) = (u, x2(u, s)) ∈
U × {0, 1}(1−R)n.
To prove our result, we will use a random coding argument in which our systematic randomized
encoder Enc is chosen uniformly at random from the class of all systematic randomized encoders.
That is, for every (u, s) ∈ U×S, the Rn-prefix of the output codeword of our encoder is the message
u ∈ U while the (1 − R)n suffix x2(u, s) is chosen independently and uniformly from {0, 1}
(1−R)n .
Note that this form of randomness is over the choice of the code is because we adopt a random
coding argument as a proof technique and not to be confused with the randomness due to the
stochastic nature of the encoder, i.e., the randomness due to the uniform choice of s ∈ S. That is,
we first chose our encoder uniformly at random from the class of encoders satisfying Definition 4.1,
2For simplicity of notation, here again we assume, w.l.o.g., that δn is an integer.
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then given a specific choice Enc of our encoder, for every message u ∈ U , we sample an s uniformly
from S and output the codeword Enc(u, s).
The decoder Dec is deterministic function that takes a received vector y ∈ {0, 1,∧}n as input
and returns two outputs: an estimated message uˆ ∈ U and also an estimated value for the encoder
local randomness sˆ ∈ S.
We do not have to require that the decoder returns an estimate for the encoder’s local ran-
domness since it is not a part of the message. However, by doing so, we actually give a stronger
result. We will show that, with high probability, our decoder recovers both the message and the
encoder’s random coins. Thus, one may think of the message as a pair (u, s), and the encoder
as deterministic. But, correct decoding with high probability is only guaranteed when s is picked
uniformly and independently of u.
Accordingly, the error criterion, with respect to (Enc,Dec) pair and for a given Adv ∈ CEp, is
the probability of the worst-case error Pnmax(Enc,Dec,Adv) averaged over the set of the encoder’s
random coins S. Precisely,
Pnmax(Enc,Dec,Adv) = max
u∈U
1
2δn
∑
y∈Yn
P (Adv (Enc (u, s)) = y)P (Dec(y) 6= (u, s)) .
The objective is to show the existence of a (Enc, Dec) which, for a sufficiently large n and for all
Adv ∈ CEp, makes P
n
max arbitrarily small.
We formally state our lower bound, RL(p), in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For all p ∈ [0, 1], the rate RL(p), given below, is achievable for every Adv ∈ CEp and
hence Cp ≥ RL(p).
RL(p) =

1− plog(4/3) , 0 ≤ p ≤ p1
r(p), p1 < p < 1/2
0, 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 1
,
where p1 =
3 log(4/3)
2+3 log(4/3) ≈ 0.384, the function r(p) is the unique root x of the equation Gp(x) = 0 in
the interval [0, 32p−
1
2 ],
Gp(x) = (1− x)H
(
p− x
1− x
)
− 1 + 2x , (7)
and H(.) is the binary entropy function.
To prove Theorem 2, we will show that our result holds for a setting stronger than the causal
setting, namely, the two-step model that is analogous to the two-step model for bit flips considered
in [9], and hence it must hold for CEp. In the two-step model, the transmission of a codeword
occurs in two steps. In the first step, the transmitter sends the first Rn bits of the codeword, i.e.,
the message u. The channel, which already knows these Rn bits since the message is fixed, erases
some of those bits. Then, in the second step, the transmitter sends the remaining (1−R)n bits of
the codeword, i.e. the suffix x2, and the channel, which now sees the whole codeword, erases some
of the last (1−R)n bits. The total number of bits the channel can erase in the two steps together
is at most pn.
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The proof relies on the notion of the forbidden ball. For a given n-bit input x to the two-step
channel and a given erasure pattern chosen by the channel in the first step, the forbidden ball is a
subset of {0, 1}n that contains every n-bit string x′ for which there is a legitimate erasure pattern
that the channel can choose in the second step such that, upon observing the whole output of the
channel, x′ and x will be equally likely to be the input to the channel. To clarify, suppose that
x = (u, x2) ∈ U ×{0, 1}
(1−R)n is the input to the channel in the two-step model. By the end of the
first step, the channel decides to erase, say, qn bits in the prefix u where q ≤ min(p,R) resulting
in a vector y1 ∈ {0, 1,∧}
Rn. We say that a vector x′ ∈ {0, 1}m is consistent with y ∈ {0, 1,∧}m if
x′i = yi for all i such that yi 6= ∧, where x
′
i (resp., yi) is the ith bit of x
′ (resp., y), that is, if x′ and
y agree in every non-erased entry. We denote the number of erasures in a vector y by ♯(y). Now,
consider the intermediate n-bit vector (y1, x2) right after the action of the channel in the first
step and before the second step. For q = ♯(y1)n , the forbidden ball B
p,q
R (y1,x2) centered at (y1, x2)
defined as
Bp,qR (y1,x2) =
{
x′1 ∈ {0, 1}
Rn : x′1 consistent with y1
}
×
{
x′2 ∈ {0, 1}
(1−R)n : dH(x
′
2,x2) ≤ (p − q)n
}
Note that the forbidden ball Bp,qR (y1, x2) is the product set of a Hamming cube with a Hamming
ball. This set contains all vectors x′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that it is possible for the channel to erase bits
in the second step (given that it already erased qn bits in the first step resulting in y1) to make
the receiver believe that x′ was a possible input string to the channel.
Clearly, the original input x = (x1,x2) lies in B
p,q
R (y1, x2). If x is a codeword and is the only
codeword lying in the forbidden ball, then, in this case, the decoder can recover the original message
successfully with no error. Our goal, roughly speaking, is to show the existence of a code where this
holds for “most” of the codewords. Using a random coding argument, one can show that, roughly
speaking, a “good” (2Rn, n) code that achieves a rate R in the two-step model exists when the size
of any such forbidden ball is smaller than 2(1−R)n by an exponential factor. To do this, a crucial step
in the existence proof is to characterize the size of such a ball. Note that the size of Bp,qR (y1, x2)
does not depend on (y1, x2). Hence, we will use B
p,q
R to denote the size of B
p,q
R (y1, x2). Lemma 3
below gives an upper bound on Bp,qR for any p ∈ [0, 1/2] and q ∈ [0, min(R, p)] when R is carefully
chosen. Before stating this lemma, we first give the following definition.
Definition 4.2 For every p ∈ (0, 1/2) and every δ, η > 0, define Rδ,η(p) as
Rδ,η(p)=
{
1− plog(4/3) −
1−log(4/3)
log(4/3) δ −
η
log(4/3) , 0 < p < p1
rδ,η(p) + δ, p1 ≤ p < 1/2
(8)
where p1 =
3 log(4/3)
2+3 log(4/3) ≈ 0.384 and rδ,η(p) is the unique solution of the equation Gp(x) + δ + η =
0, x ∈ [0, 32p−
1
2 ] (for x) where
Gp(x) = (1− x)H(
p − x
1 − x
)− 1 + 2x. (9)
Lemma 3 Let p ∈ (0, 1/2). For all sufficiently small δ, η > 0, for all sufficiently large n, if
R = Rδ,η(p)− δ (where Rδ,η(p) is as in Definition 4.2), then for every q ∈ [0, min(R, p)], the size
Bp,qR of the forbidden ball is bounded as
Bp,qR ≤ 2
(1−Rδ,η(p)−η/2)n . (10)
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The following claim will be used later to complete the proof of our main result.
Claim 1 For every p ∈ (0, 1/2), the quantity Rδ,η(p), defined in Definition 4.2, satisfies
lim
δ+η→0
Rδ,η(p) = RL(p) (11)
where RL(p) is as given by Theorem 2.
To prove Theorem 2, we consider two ways in which a decoding error can occur in the two-
step model. The first is when the decoder decides that the true codeword is one whose Rn-prefix
is different from that of the originally transmitted codeword. This is tantamount to having an
erroneous estimate for the message u ∈ U at the decoder’s output since the first Rn bits of our
encoder’s output is the message u. The second type of a decoding error is when the decoder
believes that the true codeword is one that shares the same Rn-prefix as the originally transmitted
codeword (hence resulting in a correct estimate for the message u ∈ U) but a different suffix from
the original codeword (hence resulting in the wrong estimate for s ∈ S). We refer to the former
type of errors as type-I errors while we refer to the later as type-II errors. Note that, if we are not
interested in estimating s ∈ S, then type-II errors are irrelevant and we can definitely ignore them.
However, pursuing a stronger result, we show the existence of a code of rate RL(p) that is capable
of correcting both types of errors with probability approaching 1 as n→∞.
Let S be a random variable that is uniformly distributed over S and let u ∈ U . Suppose that
(u, S) is the (message, random coins) pair. Let (u,x2(u, S)) ∈ {0, 1}
n be the transmitted codeword.
In the first step, the channel erases qn bits of the prefix u resulting in the vector y1 ∈ {0, 1,∧}
Rn
for some q ∈ [0, min(R, p)]. In the second step, the channel erases at most (p−q)n bits of x2(u, S).
An error occurs, either of type-I or type-II, when the forbidden ball Bp,qR (y1,x2(u, S)) contains at
least one legitimate codeword (u′,x′2) other than (u,x2(u, S)).
4.1 Type-I Errors:
Here, we study the case where there is at least one other codeword (u′,x′2) in B
p,q
R (y1,x2(u, S))
such that u′ 6= u. In other words, a type-I error occurs, with respect to (u, y1), whenever there
exists a message u′ 6= u and some s′ ∈ S whose corresponding codeword (u′,x2(u
′, s′)) lies inside
the forbidden ball Bp,qR (y1,x2(u, S)). Let us denote this event by ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc). Formally,
the event ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc) is defined as
ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc) ,
{
∃(u′, s′) ∈ (U \ {u})× S : Enc(u′, s′) ∈ Bp,qR (y1, x2(u, S))
}
(12)
In Definition 4.3 below, we define a property that, if possessed by a systematic code, would lead
to a vanishing probability of type-I errors.
Definition 4.3 (η˜-good systematic code w.r.t. (u,y1)) Fix R, δ > 0 and let U = {0, 1}
Rn,
and S = {0, 1}δn. Let p ∈ [0, 1/2] and fix some q ∈ [0, min(R, p)]. Let S be a random string that
is uniformly distributed over S. Fix u ∈ U and let y1 ∈ {0, 1,∧}
Rn be the resulting vector after
erasing some qn bits of u. Let η˜ > 0. A
(
2Rn, n
)
code is a η˜-good systematic code with respect to
(u, y1) if it is associated with a systematic encoder Enc (as defined in (4.1)) such that
Pn
type-I (u, y1) , P
(
ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc)
)
≤ 2−η˜n
where ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc) is as defined in (12) and the probability is over the choice of S.
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The next lemma shows that, in a two-step model with erasure rate p ∈ [0, 1/2], a systematic
code, with rate arbitrarily close to our claimed lower bound RL(p), whose codewords’ suffixes are
chosen uniformly at random is η˜-good (for some fixed η˜ > 0) with respect to all pairs (u,y1) with
overwhelming probability for sufficiently large n. This asserts the existence of at least one code for
the two-step model which is η˜-good with respect to all pairs (u,y1) which implies the existence of a
code of rate arbitrarily close to RL(p) that can correct all type-I errors with probability arbitrarily
close to 1 for sufficiently large n.
Lemma 4 Let p ∈ [0, 1/2]. For sufficiently small δ, η > 0, let R = Rδ,η(p)− δ where Rδ,η(p) is as
in Definition 4.2. Let U = {0, 1}Rn and S = {0, 1}δn. Let Enc : U × S → {0, 1}n be a systematic
randomized encoder (as defined in Definition 4.1) such that, for every u ∈ U , s ∈ S, x2(u, s) is
chosen independently and uniformly from {0, 1}(1−R)n. With probability at least 1−e−2
Ω(n)
over the
choice of Enc, the code associated with Enc is η4 -good with respect to all pairs (u,y1) ∈ U×{0, 1,∧}
Rn
where y1 is the resulting vector after erasing at most min(R, p)n bits of u.
4.2 Type-II Errors:
Here, we consider the case where the decoder outputs the correct u ∈ U but the wrong s ∈ S. In
other words, when (u, s) ∈ U × S is the (message, random coins) pair, we consider the error event
that occurs when the decoder confuses the actual codeword (u,x2(u, s)) with some other codeword
(u,x′2) for some x
′
2 6= x2(u, s). Our goal is to show that, when our systematic encoder Enc is
such that, for every u ∈ U and s ∈ S, x2(u, s) is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}
(1−R)n ,
then with an overwhelming probability over the choice of Enc, such error event does not occur for
“almost” all (u, s) ∈ U × S.
Roughly speaking, we need to show that Enc has the property that, except for a few pairs of
codewords, any pair of codewords that share the same prefix (i.e., that correspond to the same
message u ∈ U) are not very close to each other in the Hamming distance. More precisely, for
p ∈ [0, 1/2), except for a small subset of codewords, any pair of codewords that share the same
prefix will, with high probability (over the choice of the code), be at Hamming distance greater
than pn. In fact, the following lemma gives us what we are looking for. The following lemma is
closely related to Lemma III.4 in [9]. The proof of the following lemma follows from the standard
distance argument in the proof of the GV bound. The proof is omitted since it follows similar steps
to that of Lemma III.4 in [9].
Lemma 5 Let p ∈ [0, 1/2), 0 < R < 1− 2p and let δ > 0 be sufficiently small. Let Enc : U × S →
{0, 1}n be a systematic encoder (as in Definition 4.1) such that, for every u ∈ U and s ∈ S,
x2(u, s) is chosen independently and uniformly from {0, 1}
(1−R)n. There exists a γ > 0 for which
the following holds for all sufficiently large n. With probability at least 1 − e−2
Ω(n)
over the choice
of the encoder Enc, a code associated with Enc satisfies the following: There exists a set V ⊂ U with
|V| ≤ 2(R−γ)n such that for every u ∈ U \ V, there exists Qu ⊆ S of size |Qu| < 2
(δ−γ)n such that
for every distinct s, s′ ∈ S \ Qu, we have dH (x2(u, s),x2(u, s
′)) > pn.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 2:
Let p ∈ (0, 1/2). Let δ, η > 0 be sufficiently small, Rδ,η(p) be as in Definition 4.2, R = Rδ,η − δ,
U = {0, 1}Rn, and S = {0, 1}δn. Let Enc be a systematic randomized encoder that satisfies the
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conditions in Lemmas 4 and 5 simultaneously. Note that the existence of such encoder is guaranteed
since, by Lemmas 4 and 5, the probability that a systematic randomized encoder Enc satisfies the
conditions of those lemmas simultaneously is at least 1−e−2
Ω(n)
. Let γ > 0, V ⊂ U , and {Qu, u ∈ V}
be as in Lemma 5 where V = U \ V.
Let Qu = S\Qu, u ∈ V. Let’s order the members of Qu, say, lexicographically, and denote them
by sQu (1) < ... < sQu
(
|Qu|
)
. Let T denote minu∈V |Qu|. Hence, by Lemma 5, T ≥ 2
δn− 2(δ−γ)n ≥
2δn−1 for sufficiently large n. Define T , {1, ..., 2δn−1}. Define a new encoder E˜nc : V×T as follows.
For every (u, t) ∈ V×T , E˜nc(u, t) = Enc(u, sQu(t)). Note that, by Lemma 5, |V| ≥ 2
Rn−2(R−γ)n ≥
2Rn−1 for sufficiently large n. This, together with the fact that |T | = 2δn−1 (as shown above),
implies that E˜nc has the same asymptotic rate as Enc. Namely, limn→∞ log
(
|V| · |T |
)
= R + δ =
Rδ,η(p).
Thus, it remains to show that the probability of decoding error Pnmax with respect to E˜nc decays
to zero as n→∞. To do this, we consider each of the two types of decoding error. First, for type-
I errors, since the code associated with Enc is a η4 -good systematic code for all (u, y1) whose
existence is shown by Lemma 4, then the probability of such type of errors is bounded from above
by 2
(δ−
η
4 )n
2δn−1
= 2−
η
4
n+1. For errors of type-II, since u ∈ V and since we pruned the code associated
with Enc by getting rid off the all the “bad” s, namely, those in
⋃
u∈V Qu. Hence, according to
Lemma 5, any pair of codewords that have the same prefix are at Hamming distance strictly greater
than pn. Since the channel can only erase at most pn bits in the second step, the decoder will
always know which codeword was originally transmitted and hence decodes successfully. Thus, the
pruned code associated with E˜nc, can correct all type-II errors .
Summing up, the probability of decoding error according to the above analysis of the two types
of errors is P(Type-I error occurs) ≤ 2−
η
4
n+1 = 2−Ω(n) which can be made arbitrarily small for
sufficiently large n.
A Proofs of Section 3
We give here the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 of Section 3.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1:
Note that we have I(U ;X1) ≤ H(X1) ≤ ℓ = (RUpper(p) +
ǫ
2)n. Thus,
H(U |X1) ≥ H(U)− (RUpper(p) +
ǫ
2
)n = nR− (RUpper(p) +
ǫ
2
)n = n
ǫ
2
By Markov’s inequality,
P
(
nR−H(U |X1 = x1) ≥ nR− n
ǫ
4
)
≤
nR− n ǫ2
nR− n ǫ4
= 1−
ǫ
4
R− ǫ4
Since ǫ ≤ R ≤ 1, it follows that P
(
H(U |X1 = x1) ≥ n
ǫ
4
)
≥ ǫ4
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2:
First, we give the following two lemmas that will be useful in proving Lemma 2.
Lemma 6 (Plotkin’s Bound3 [15]) A binary (M,n) code C must satisfy M ≤
2davg
2davg−n
whenever
the average distance davg >
n
2 where davg =
1
M(M−1)
∑
x,y∈C dH(x,y).
Lemma 7 ([4], Lemma 3) Let V be a random variable on a discrete finite set V with entropy
H(V ) ≥ λ, and let V1, V2, ..., Vm be i.i.d. copies of V . Then
P ({Vi : i = 1, ...,m}are all distinct)≥
(
λ− 1− log(m)
log(|V|)
)m−1
.
Now, consider the situation by the end of the “wait” phase. Let X1 = x1 for some x1 ∈ Aǫ.
Suppose that we sample (with replacement) m codewords X(1), ...,X(m) from Lx1 according to
the conditional distribution of the encoder’s output given the observed ℓ-prefix x1 denoted by
PX|X1=x1 . That is, X(1), ...,X(m) are i.i.d. with distribution PX|X1=x1 . Let U1, ..., Um denote the
corresponding messages, respectively. LetX′ denote the codeword drawn from Lx1 by the adversary
by the end of the “wait” phase and U ′ denote the corresponding message. Note that the transmitted
codewordX and the adversary’s codewordX′ are independent and identically distributed according
to PX|X1=x1 in the same fashion any pair in the set of m codewords {X(1), ...,X(m)} mentioned
above are independent and identically distributed. Similarly, the original message U and the
adversary’s message U ′ are independent and identically distributed according to PU |X1=x1 (the
conditional distribution of the message U given that X1 = x1) in the same fashion any pair in the
set of m messages {U1, ..., Um} mentioned above are independent and identically distributed.
Proposition 1 Let E3 denote the event {U1, ..., Um are all distinct} for some integer m. Then,
for sufficiently large n, we have P(E3 | X1 = x1) ≥ (
ǫ
5 )
m−1.
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that x1 ∈ Aǫ and the result of Lemma 7 above. We apply
Lemma 7 with the distribution of V set to the distribution of U conditioned on X1 = x1 and
λ = n ǫ4 . Hence, we get
P(E3 | X1 = x1) ≥
(
nǫ/4− log(m)− 1
n
)m−1
>
(
ǫ
4
−
log(m)
n
)m−1
For fixed m and sufficiently large n, we have log(m) ≤ ǫ20n. Hence, the proof is complete. ✷
Let Cm denote the collection of codewords {X(1), ...,X(m)} picked in the fashion described
above for some m (to be decided later). Let davg(Cm) be the average Hamming distance between
any pair in Cm defined as
davg(Cm) ,
1
m(m− 1)
∑
i 6=j
dH(X(i),X(j))
3Here, we give the version of Plotkin’s bound on the average distance of a binary code.
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where the sum is over all distinct i, j in {1, ...,m}. Note that davg(Cm) is a random variable.
Now, suppose we condition on both events {X1 = x1} and E3 (Note that the former event has
been already conditioned upon from the beginning of the proof). The following upper bound on
davg(Cm) holds with probability 1.
davg(Cm) ≤
1
2
m
m− 1
(n− ℓ) =
m
m− 1
(p− ǫ/4)n (13)
This bound follows directly from Plotkin’s bound stated in Lemma 6 above and the choice ℓ specified
in the lemma statement. By setting m = 9ǫ , we further upper bound the right-hand side of (13) to
get
davg(Cm) ≤ np− n
ǫ
8
Hence, conditioned on {X1 = x1, E3}, the expected average Hamming distance E [davg(Cm)| X1 = x1, E3]
is upper bounded as
E [davg(Cm)| X1 = x1, E3] ≤ np− n
ǫ
8
(14)
On the other hand, we have
E [davg(Cm)| X1 = x1, E3] =
1
m(m− 1)
∑
i 6=j
E [dH(X(i),X(j))| X1 = x1, E3]
= E [dH(X(1),X(2))| X1 = x1, E3] (15)
where (15) is due to symmetry, i.e., the fact that, conditioned on {X1 = x1, E3}, the distributions
of all pairs (X(i), X(j)) for i 6= j in {1, ...,m} are identical. From (14) and (15), we get
E [dH(X(1),X(2))| X1 = x1, E3] ≤ np− n
ǫ
8
Thus, by Markov’s inequality, we have
P (dH(X(1),X(2)) > np | X1 = x1, E3) ≤
E [dH(X(1),X(2)) | X1 = x1, E3]
np
≤
np− n ǫ8
np
= 1−
ǫ
8p
(16)
Finally, we derive bound (6) in the lemma statement as follows.
P
(
dH(X,X
′) > np,U 6= U ′ | X1 = x1
)
= P (dH(X(1),X(2)) > np,U1 6= U2 | X1 = x1) (17)
≥ P (dH(X(1),X(2)) > np,E3 | X1 = x1) (18)
= P (dH(X(1),X(2)) > np | X1 = x1, E3)P(E3| X1 = x1)
≥
ǫ
8p
(
ǫ
5
)9/ǫ−1 = ǫO(1/ǫ) (19)
where (17) follows from the fact that the joint distribution of (X,X′, U, U ′) is the same as that
of (X(1),X(2), U1 , U2), (18) follows from the fact that E3 implies U1 6= U2, and (19) follows from
Proposition 1 and (16). This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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B Proofs of Section 4
We give here the proofs of Lemma 3, Claim 1, and Lemma 4 of Section 4.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3:
For now, suppose p ∈ (0, 1/2), 1−2p ≤ R < 1 and 0 ≤ q ≤ min(p,R). We start by giving a general
upper bound for Bp,qR using the standard bounds on Hamming balls. First, it is easy to see that
Bp,qR is given by
Bp,qR = 2
qn
(p−q)n∑
i=0
(
(1−R)n
i
)
By using the standard bound on the Hamming ball of radius (p − q)n in {1, 0}(1−R)n whose exact
size is
∑(p−q)n
i=0
((1−R)n
i
)
, we get
Bp,qR ≤ 2
qn · 2
(
(1−R)H( p−q
(1−R)
)+β
)
n
(20)
for some arbitrarily small β > 0 for sufficiently large n. Note that such bound is valid since
p−q
1−R ≤ 1/2.
Now, we make specific choices for our parameters. Let p ∈ (0, 1/2). Let δ, η > 0 be chosen
such that
δ + η ≤

3 log(4/3) − 1 if 0 < p < 1/3
3
2 log(4/3) − (
3
2 log(4/3) + 1)p if 1/3 ≤ p < p1
1−H(p) if p1 ≤ p < 1/2
(21)
where p1 =
3 log(4/3)
2+3 log(4/3) . Let Rδ,η(p) be as given in the lemma statement and R = Rδ,η(p)−δ. Hence,
for q ∈ [0, min (Rδ,η(p)− δ, p)], (20) can be written as
Bp,qR ≤ 2
(fp,δ,Rδ,η (p)(q)+β)n (22)
where
fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q) = q+(1−Rδ,η(p)+δ)H
(
p− q
1−Rδ,η(p) + δ
)
Now, let’s consider the simple optimization problem where we seek to maximize fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q)
over q ∈ [0,min (Rδ,η(p)− δ, p)]. First, fix some p ∈ (0, p1). It is not difficult to see that the
maximizer q∗ of fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q) in [0, min (Rδ,η(p)− δ, p)] is given by
q∗ = p−
1
3
(1−Rδ,η(p) + δ) whenever 0 ≤ p−
1
3
(1−Rδ,η(p) + δ) ≤ Rδ,η(p)− δ (23)
The first two constraints on δ+ η in (21) and the setting of Rδ,η(p) for p ∈ (0, p1) in (8) imply the
condition in (23). Thus, one can easily verify that, for every p ∈ (0, p1), we have
fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q) ≤ fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q
∗) = 1−Rδ,η(p)− η ∀ q ∈ [0, min(R, p)] (24)
16
Next, fix some p ∈ [p1, 1/2). One can easily verify that the maximizer q
∗ of fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q) over
[0, min(R, p)] (note that R = Rδ,η(p)− δ) is given by
q∗ = Rδ,η(p)− δ whenever Rδ,η(p)− δ < p−
1
3
(1−Rδ,η(p) + δ) (25)
Now, we show that the last constraint on δ+η in (21) and the setting of Rδ,η(p) for p ∈ [p1, 1/2) in
(8) imply the condition in (25). Observe that rδ,η(p) in (8), if exists, is the root of Gp(x)+δ+η = 0,
whereGp(x) is given by (9), in the interval [0,
3
2p−
1
2). Hence, we have 0 ≤ Rδ,η(p)−δ <
3
2p−
1
2 which
implies the condition in (25). Thus, it is left to show that there exists a root of Gp(x) + δ + η = 0
in [0, 32p−
1
2). To do this, notice that Gp(x) is strictly increasing in x over the interval [0,
3
2p−
1
2 )
with Gp(0) = −(1 − H(p)) and Gp(
3
2p −
1
2) ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ [p1,
1
2). This together with the fact that
0 < δ + η ≤ 1 − H(p) (last constraint on δ + η) implies the existence of a unique root rδ,η(p) of
Gp(x) + δ + η in the interval [0,
3
2p−
1
2).
Thus, for every p ∈ [p1, 1/2), we have
fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q) ≤ fp,δ,Rδ,η(p)(q
∗)
= rδ,η(p) + (1− rδ,η(p))H(
p − rδ,η(p)
1 − rδ,η(p)
)
= 1− rδ,η(p)− δ − η (26)
= 1−Rδ,η(p)− η ∀ q ∈ [0, min(R, p)] (27)
where (26) follows from the fact that rδ,η(p) is the root of Gp(x) + δ + η = 0.
Therefore, for every p ∈ (0, 1/2), from (22), (24), and (27), we get
Bp,qR ≤ 2
(1−Rδ,η(p)−η+β)n ∀ q ∈ [0, min(R, p)]
By choosing n to be sufficiently large, we can make β < η2 and thus we get the desired upper bound
in the lemma. This completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Claim 1:
We note that, for p ∈ (0, p1), the result is immediate where p1 is as given in Lemma 3. Let
p ∈ [p1, 1/2). Consider Gp(x) over the interval [0,
3
2p−
1
2) where Gp(x) is as given in Lemma 3. It
is easy to see that, over this interval, Gp(x) is continuous and strictly increasing. Hence, we can
define and inverse function G−1p (y) that maps the range of Gp(.) over [0,
3
2p −
1
2) to [0,
3
2p −
1
2).
Note that G−1p (y) is also continuous and strictly increasing over this interval (i.e., over the image
of [0, 32p−
1
2) under Gp(.)). In this manner, rδ,η(p), as given in Lemma 3, is indeed G
−1
p (−(δ + η)).
Hence, by the continuity of G−1p , we have
lim
δ+η→0
rδ,η(p) = lim
δ+η→0
G−1p (−(δ + η)) = G
−1
p (0) = r(p)
where r(p) is as given in Theorem 2. This completes the proof.
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 4:
We will first prove that, with probability 1 − e−2
Ω(n)
over the choice of Enc, the code associated
with Enc is η4 -good for a fixed pair (u, y1). Then, we conclude the proof by applying the union
bound taken over all such pairs.
Let q ∈ [0, min(R, p)]. Let u ∈ U and y1 ∈ {0, 1,∧}
Rn such that y1 is the resulting vector after
erasing some qn bits of u. Let C(u) denote the set of suffixes of the codewords that correspond
to all the messages u′ 6= u. That is, C(u) = {X2(u
′, s′) : u′ ∈ U \ {u}, s′ ∈ S}. Note, by the
choice of the code, C(u) is a set of independent and uniformly distributed random variables over
{0, 1}(1−R)n . Now, conditioned on the value of local randomness S = s, one can think of two
sources of randomness in the choice of Enc, namely, X2(u, s) (the suffix of the actual codeword)
and C(u) (the list of suffixes of codewords corresponding to all u′ 6= u). Note that the event
ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc) (defined in (12)) depends on both sources of randomness in the choice of Enc
as well as the randomness due to the choice of S. In fact, it can be, equivalently, written as
ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc) ,
{
∃ X2(u
′, s′) ∈ C(u) :
(
u′, X2(u
′, s′)
)
∈ Bp,qR (y1, X2(u, S))
}
The probability of ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc) taken over the choice of S, denoted by P
n
type-I (u, y1), is
now a random variable since it depends on the choice of Enc, namely, it depends on both X2(u, S)
and C(u).
Our goal is to show that P
(
Pn
type-I (u, y1) ≤ 2
− η
4
n
)
≥ 1−e−2
Ω(n)
where the outer probability is
over the choice of the code (that is, over X2(u, S) and C(u)). To do this, we will show the existence
of a subset Behaved of the set of all the possible realizations of C(u), such that, for sufficiently
small η > 0, we have
P
(
C(u) ∈ Behaved
)
≥ 1− e−2
Ω(n)
and
P
(
Pn
type-I (u, y1) ≤ 2
− η
4
n | C(u) ∈ Behaved
)
≥ 1− e−2
Ω(n)
Now, for every z ∈ {0, 1}(1−R)n , define
Lz
(
y1, C(u)
)
,
∣∣∣∣{X2(u′, s′) ∈ C(u) : (u′, X2(u′, s′)) ∈ Bp,qR (y1, z)}∣∣∣∣
Let 1(.) denote the indicator function that takes value 1 whenever its argument is true and 0
otherwise. Note that ErrorI (u,y1, S;Enc) is equivalent to the event that
{
LX2(u,S)
(
y1, C(u)
)
≥ 1
}
.
Hence, conditioned on {X2(u, s) = x2(u, s), C(u) = c(u) : s ∈ S} (that is, for a fixed set of suffixes
of all the codewords), we have
Pn
type-I (u, y1) =
∑
s∈S
P(S = s)1
(
Lx2(u,s) (y1, c(u)) ≥ 1
)
=
1
2δn
∑
s∈S
1
(
Lx2(u,s) (y1, c(u)) ≥ 1
)
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A crucial part in the proof is to obtain, for every s ∈ S, an upper bound on
E
[
LX2(u,s)
(
y1,C(u)
) ∣∣∣ C(u) = c(u)]
for any realization c(u) of C(u) that lies in a set (denoted as Behaved) of an overwhelming proba-
bility over the choice of C(u). We proceed as follows. First, we find a set Behaved of realizations of
C(u) for which the sum
∑
z∈{0,1}(1−R)n Lz
(
y1,C(u)
)
is not too far from its expectation (over C(u))
and show that such set has an overwhelming probability (over the choice of C(u)). Using this we
then obtain an upper bound on the conditional expectation E
[
LX2(u,s)
(
y1,C(u)
) ∣∣∣ C(u) = c(u)]
(over X2(u, s)) for every s ∈ S and every c(u) ∈ Behaved. Finally, we use this to show that,
with overwhelming probability (over the choice of the suffixes {X2(u, s) : s ∈ S}), we have
Pn
type-I (u, y1) ≤ 2
− η
4
n.
For every u′ ∈ U \ {u}, s′ ∈ S, define
Vu′,s′
(
y1, C(u)
)
,
∣∣∣∣{z ∈ {0, 1}(1−R)n : Enc(u′, s′) ∈ Bp,qR (y1, z)}∣∣∣∣ (28)
Now, observe that
σ
(
y1,C(u)
)
,
∑
z∈{0,1}(1−R)n
Lz
(
y1,C(u)
)
(29)
=
∑
u′∈U\{u}
∑
s′∈S
Vu′,s′
(
y1, C(u)
)
=
∣∣∣∣{(u′, s′, z) ∈ (U \ {u})× S × {0, 1}(1−R)n : Enc(u′, s′) ∈ Bp,qR (y1, z)}∣∣∣∣
On the other hand,
{
Vu′,s′
(
y1,C(u)
)
: u′ ∈ U \ {u}, s′ ∈ S
}
are independent random variables.
Moreover, for every u′ ∈ U \ {u}, s′ ∈ S
E[Vu′,s′
(
y1, C(u)
)
] ≤ 2(1−R)n
Bp,qR
2n − 2(1−R)n
≤ 2 · 2(1−R)n
Bp,qR
2n
=
2Bp,qR
2Rn
for sufficiently large n. For all (u′, s′) ∈ (U \ {u}) × S, let V˜u′,s′
(
y1, C(u)
)
,
Vu′,s′ (y1, C(u))
Bp,q
R
.
Clearly, from (28), we have V˜u′,s′
(
y1, C(u)
)
≤ 1 for all (u′, s′) ∈ (U \ {u}) × S.
Let
σ˜
(
y1,C(u)
)
,
∑
u′∈U\{u}
∑
s′∈S
V˜u′,s′
(
y1, C(u)
)
(30)
Hence, we have
P
(
σ
(
y1,C(u)
)
≥ 2nδ+2Bp,qR
)
= P
(
σ˜
(
y1,C(u)
)
≥ 2nδ+2
)
(31)
≤ P
(
σ˜
(
y1,C(u)
)
≥ 4
2nRδ,η(p) − 2δn
2Rn
)
≤ e−2
Ω(n)
(32)
where (31) follows from (29), (30), and the definition of V˜u′,s′
(
y1,C(u)
)
above, and (32) follows
from Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [10] restated in the following lemma.
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Lemma 8 (Chernoff-Hoeffding) Let X1,X2, ...,XN be independent random variables taking values
in [0, 1] with expectation at most µ. Then,
P
(
N∑
i=1
Xi ≥ 2µN
)
≤ e−Ω(µN)
Now, we define Behaved as the set of all realizations c(u) of C(u) such that∑
z∈{0,1}(1−R)n
Lz (y1, c(u)) ≤ 2
nδ+2Bp,qR
Thus, we have
P
(
C(u) ∈ Behaved
)
≥ 1− e−2
Ω(n)
Next, we will show that, conditioned on
{
C(u) ∈ Behaved
}
, we have
Pn
type-I (u, y1) =
1
2δn
∑
s∈S
1
(
LX2(u,s)
(
y1,C(u)
)
≥ 1
)
≤ 2−
η
4
n
with overwhelming probability over the choice of {X2(u, s) : s ∈ S}. To do this, we first bound
the conditional expectation E
[
LX2(u,s)
(
y1,C(u)
) ∣∣∣ C(u) = c(u)] (over X2(u, s)) for every s ∈ S
and every c(u) ∈ Behaved.
Observe that, for every s ∈ S and every c(u) ∈ Behaved,
E
[
LX2(u,s)
(
y1,C(u)
) ∣∣∣ C(u) = c(u)] ≤ 1
2(1−R)n
2nδ+2Bp,qR (33)
≤ 4 · 2−
η
2
n (34)
where (33) follows from the fact that, conditioned on
{
C(u) = c(u)
}
where c(u) ∈ Behaved, we
must have
∑
z∈{0,1}(1−R)n Lz
(
y1,C(u)
)
≤ 2nδ+2Bp,qR , and (34) follows from Lemma 3. It follows
that, for every s ∈ S and every c(u) ∈ Behaved, we must have
E
[
1
(
LX2(u,s)
(
y1,C(u)
)
≥ 1
) ∣∣∣ C(u) = c(u)] ≤ E [LX2(u,s) (y1,C(u)) ∣∣∣ C(u) = c(u)]
≤ 4 · 2−
η
2
n (35)
Moreover, observe that, conditioned on
{
C(u) = c(u)
}
where c(u) ∈ Behaved, the collection
{LX2(u,s) (y1, c(u)) : s ∈ S} is independent and identically distributed. Recall that P
n
type-I (u, y1) =
1
2δn
∑
s∈S 1
(
LX2(u,s)
(
y1,C(u)
)
≥ 1
)
. Thus, we have
P
(
Pn
type-I (u, y1) ≥ 2
− η
4
n
∣∣∣ C(u) ∈ Behaved)
=
∑
c(u)∈Behaved
P
(
Pn
type-I (u, y1) ≥ 2
− η
4
n
∣∣∣ C(u) = c(u))P(C(u) = c(u) ∣∣∣ C(u) ∈ Behaved)
≤e−2
Ω(n)
∑
c(u)∈Behaved
P
(
C(u) = c(u)
∣∣∣ C(u) ∈ Behaved) (36)
=e−2
Ω(n)
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where (36) follows from (35) and Chernoff-Hoeffding bound (Lemma 8).
Thus, we finally get
P
(
Pn
type-I (u, y1) ≤ 2
− η
4
n
)
≥ P
(
Pn
type-I (u, y1) ≤ 2
− η
4
n
∣∣∣ C(u) ∈ Behaved)P (C(u) ∈ Behaved)
≥
(
1− e−2
Ω(n)
)(
1− e−2
Ω(n)
)
= 1− e−2
Ω(n)
(37)
So far, we have shown that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of Enc, the code
associated with Enc is η4 -good with respect to a fixed pair (u, y1). To complete the proof, we
apply the union bound over all possible pairs (u, y1) ∈ U × {0, 1,∧}
Rn such that y1 has at most
min(p,R)n erasures. Note that due to the doubly exponential probability profile of (37), we still
attain η4 -goodness with probability at least 1− e
−2Ω(n) after applying the union bound.
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